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WALL

Tax credits come in many forms
and serve an array of purposes,
although economic development is
central to their existence. Although
tax credits come in many forms,
they all share a basic structure: They
are provided to a private entity for a
specific project, usually to enhance
the entity’s ability to obtain
financing. The holder of a tax credit
can apply it against his or her tax
liabilities according to its
redemption value, its redemption
date, and other rules governing the
credit.
This paper summarizes the findings
in the economics literature on the
effectiveness of state tax credits in
spurring economic development.
Based on the literature, the three
important lessons to be learned
about applying tax credits are:
• Tax credits generally have not
been found to lead to increased
employment even at firms that
receive them. This result seems
to depend somewhat on the
incentive structure of the tax
credit program.
• In some sectors and some
localities, it is possible for tax
credits to lead to increased
employment in non-recipient
firms. This suggests that
agglomeration economies might
play a limited role in
determining the effectiveness of
tax credits. The literature
provides little to no guidance,
however, as to when and where

tax credits can be targeted for
this purpose.
• State tax credits do not tend to
lead to higher levels of
employment for local residents,
nor, by extension, do they lead
to higher levels of employment
for state residents.
These lessons are consistent with
the general literature on the, at best,
lukewarm effects of development
incentives on local employment.
Keep in mind that the tax credit
programs examined typically are
geared directly at job creation. This
suggests that for states like Missouri,
which tend to have dual-purpose tax
credit programs, it would be
difficult to find strong evidence that
development tax credits have
generate significant increases in
overall economic activity.
1. INTRODUCTION
Tax incentives are among the main
instruments of state and local
economic development policy, and
tax credits are among the most
revalent types of tax incentive.1 Tax
credits come in many forms and
serve an array of purposes, although
economic development is central to
their existence.2 The purpose of this
paper is to summarize the findings
in the economics literature on the
effectiveness of state tax credits in
spurring economic development.
The context for this survey is the
establishment of an official
commission to review Missouri’s tax
credit programs with the purpose of
streamlining and consolidating the
state’s myriad tax credit programs.3
The commission’s efforts are
1
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The remainder of this paper surveys
the state of the academic literature
regarding the effectiveness of
economic development incentives,
with particular attention paid to
state tax credits. The next two
sections describe the basic structure
of tax credits and their use in
Missouri. Sections 4 and 5 discuss
the use of development incentives
in general, first outlining the
economic efficiency arguments in
their favor and then summarizing
the literature estimating their effects.
Section 6 describes the literature
dealing specifically with the effects
of tax credits, and the final section
provides three broad conclusions
drawn from this literature.
2. THE BASIC STRUCTURE
OF TAX CREDITS
Although tax credits come in many
forms, they all share a basic
structure. They are provided to a
private entity for a specific project,
usually to enhance the entity’s ability
to obtain financing. The holder of a
tax credit can apply it against his or
her tax liabilities according to its
redemption value, its redemption
date, and other rules governing the
credit. Typically, tax credits are
transferable, meaning that they can
be bought and sold, although the
market price will be below the
redemption value. The holder might
have bought the credits several years
before they can be redeemed, and
the bigger the gap between the
purchase and redemption dates, the
larger the discount. Further, holding
WALL

tax credits entails some risk because
they often have a provision, called a
clawback, that negates them in the
event that a project is not
completed. Finally, various limits
can be placed on the timing of
redemption, such as whether they
can be carried back (used against
previous years taxes with amended
tax returns) or carried forward (applied
to some number of future years’
taxes).
Tax credits are just one form of tax
offset used as an economic
development incentive. With tax
diversion, taxes are collected but are
then transferred to pay for a specific
project such as additional
infrastructure. Tax abatement is a
straightforward reduction in future
taxes, such as a when a firm is not
assessed property taxes for a set
number of years on a new
investment. Similarly, a firm could
benefit from a tax deferral, which
allows it to postpone its tax
payments, or be allowed a tax
deduction to lower its taxable income.
Because tax credits are provided up
front and have a specified value,
they are closer than any of these
other tax offsets to a direct payment

to the firm from the government.
Transferability makes the tax credits
even more similar to a direct
payment.
3. TAX CREDITS IN
MISSOURI
In Missouri, $588 million of tax
credits of all types were redeemed
during fiscal year 2009, a value 4
times that for 1999.4 As also shown
in Figure 1, tax credits have become
an increasingly prominent feature of
tax policy, rising from about 3
percent to over 8 percent of the
revenue collected by the related
taxes between 1999 and 2009.
Missouri had 64 tax credit programs
in 2009, including large programs
with purposes in addition to
economic development, such as
historic preservation and the
provision of affordable housing.
Figure 2 presents the breakdown of
Missouri’s tax credits for the
amounts issued in 2009. Note that
six categories alone accounted for
more than three-fourths of all tax
credits issued. Even more telling,
nearly two-thirds of all tax credits
issued fell under just three

Figure 1. The Increased Use of Tax Credits in Missouri, 1999-2009
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categories: Low-Income Housing,
Historic Preservation, and Senior
Citizen or Disabled Person
Property. Similarly, as shown by
Figure 3, the redemption of tax
credits was similarly skewed toward
a handful of categories. The six
largest categories accounted for
more than 80 percent of all
redemptions in 2009, and the three
largest accounted for about 70
percent of the total.
4. EFFICIENCY
ARGUMENTS FOR TAX
CREDITS

Figure 2. Shares of Tax Credits Issued, 2009
Low-Income Housing (25.1%)
Historic Preservation (20.6%)
Senior Citizen or Disabled
Person Property (20.4%)
Brownfield Redevelopment
(Remediation) (3.8%)
Infrastructure Development
(3.4%)
Missouri Examination Fee
(3.0%)
Other (23.6%)
Source: Missouri Committee on Legislative Research

In the benchmark model of an
economy, factors of production
such as labor and capital are
perfectly mobile and markets for
consumption goods and factors of
production are perfectly
competitive. Under these conditions
(and many others), unfettered
markets will produce a Pareto-efficient
outcome. That is, there will be no
reallocation of inputs or output that
can make one person better off
without making at least one other
person worse off. The Pareto
criterion, though confining, is useful
because it allows economists to
focus on economic efficiency and to
abstract from considerations that
are more philosophical in nature,
such as whether one outcome is
more “just” or “equitable” than
another.

discussed in greater detail below, the
free market will not achieve the
efficient outcome and there might
be room for government
intervention to improve economic
efficiency.

Economists do not believe that the
benchmark model describes the
actual economy exactly. It is used
because economists tend to believe
that, even with its strict assumptions
and simplicity, it is a useful
representation of reality.
Nonetheless, most economists
recognize that there can be market
failures for which differences
between the actual economy and the
benchmark economy are significant.
In such situations, which are

It is very important to keep in mind
that the mere existence of market
failures does not necessarily imply
that the government should step in.
Analogous to market failure is
government failure, for which
government action makes the
outcome even worse than the lessthan optimal free-market outcome.
Government failure can arise for a
number of reasons. For one thing,
the information required to
formulate effective intervention is
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Figure 3. Shares of Tax Credits Redeemed, 2009
Historic Preservation (31.7%)
Senior Citizen or Disabled
Person Property (20.2%)
Low-Income Housing (18.0%)

Brownfield Redevelopment
(Remediation) (5.0%)
Infrastructure Development
(4.6%)
Neighborhood Assistance
(2.2%)
Other (18.3%)
Source: Missouri Committee on Legislative Research

daunting, to say the least. But even
if policymakers know exactly the
correct policy to correct a market
failure, government failure is still an
inherent risk simply because of the
nature of government decision
making: Representative democracy
may well be the best way to run a
country, but few would claim, for
example, that the horse trading that
is typical of democratic process is
likely to achieve an idealized notion
of economic efficiency. In addition,
the affected parties will not sit idly
by once a government decides to
intervene in the economy. Instead,
they will expend resources trying to
influence government policy to steer
it in directions most favorable to
themselves. At its most complete,
3
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this rent-seeking can result in regulatory
capture, whereby one of the parties
affected by an intervention
effectively takes control of
government decision making and
uses the power of government to
enrich itself.
The general framework of market
and government failures is useful
for assessing the use of state and
local development incentives to
improve economic efficiency. For
development incentives to be
effective, the government must be
able to identify the circumstances
under which intervention will
improve efficiency and then design
government institutions in ways that
ensure that the intervention will not
end up making things worse.
The remainder of this section
describes various types of market
failures for which local development
incentives might be appropriate
solutions. The market-failure
approach is also used by Bartik
(1990, 1994) and Courant (1994),
although the market failures they
stress differ somewhat from mine,
which are imperfect capital markets,
public goods, agglomeration
economies, and involuntary
unemployment.

4.A. Imperfect Capital Markets
It is rare for a business to start or
expand without having to raise
money in financial markets. More
often than not, this involves
borrowing from banks, which are
among the most-regulated firms in
the economy. Entry into the
banking sector is restricted, so the
level of competition is far from the
perfect competition of the
benchmark model. This lack of
competition might limit the amount
of lending that banks are willing to
do and, therefore, result in
suboptimal levels of economic
WALL

activity. Banks are also monitored
by regulators and face limits on the
amount of risk they can carry, which
might also mean that they lend too
little. Strictly speaking, these
imperfections are not due directly to
market failures, but are the
consequence of government policies
to achieve other ends. Nevertheless,
these negative consequences are out
of the hands of the makers of state
and local development policy.
In addition to government-induced
imperfections, the banking sector
can be affected by the absence of
complete insurance markets. That is,
banks are unable to insure
completely against the incidence of
default on loans they make because
of moral hazard and adverse selection,
problems that are inherent to any
insurance market. If banks were able
to insure completely, they would
have less incentive to monitor the
loans that they make because any
losses would be borne by the
insurers rather than the banks
(moral hazard). In addition, because
banks might have better information
about the riskiness of their loans
than would insurers, insurance
would more likely be sought only
for the riskiest loans (adverse
selection). Either of these problems
would make the insurance markets
for banks incomplete and, therefore,
can result in a suboptimal level of
lending.
Because of such financial market
imperfections, development
incentives might be a way for state
and local governments to step in so
that the ventures foregone are
pursued. Because they can be used
as collateral, tax credits can be
thought of as one way to address
the possibility of less-than-optimal
lending to businesses. Tax credits
are a fairly roundabout way of
addressing imperfections in financial
markets, however. More directly,

policies such as loan guarantees are
a way to reduce the risk exposure of
banks and induce them to support
ventures they would otherwise
avoid.
Policymakers should be warned that
it is not particularly easy to address
imperfections in financial markets.
A successful policy would require
being able to select just those
ventures that would be foregone
because of financial market
imperfections and not because they
are bad ideas. Compounding this
challenge is that the selection will be
done through a political process of
some sort.

4.B. Public Goods
Historic-preservation tax credits are
one of the most widely used
development tax credits in Missouri
and are given to assist in
redeveloping historic structures. As
with any development incentive,
these tax credits are used to spur
economic development. But,
because they are directed towards
historic buildings, they serve the
additional role of subsidizing the
provision of a public good. Public
goods have two defining
characteristics: (1) when consumed
by someone there is no reduction in
the amount available to anyone else;
and (2) no one can be excluded
from consuming the good. Because
of these characteristics, public goods
would not be provided by the
private sector without some
government incentive to do so.
In the case of historic-preservation
tax credits, the presumed public
good being subsided is the historic
nature of the redeveloped buildings.
Anyone can drive by and enjoy a
historic structure without reducing
the ability of someone else to do the
same. Because this enjoyment
cannot be sold by the developer, he
4
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or she must be given some sort of
inducement to preserve the historic
nature of the structure rather than
building a new structure elsewhere
or replacing the historic structure
with a new, less-expensive one.
The public goods argument is
illustrated by Figure 4, which
represents the market for historic
preservation. Presumably, occupants
of rented office or housing space are
willing to pay some premium for
some level of historic preservation
for the buildings they occupy, but
the amount they are willing to pay is
decreasing in the level of historic
preservation (i.e., occupants’
demand for historic preservation is
downward sloping). The marginal
cost of historic preservation rises
with the amount of preservation
that is done, meaning that its supply
is upward sloping. In the absence of
government intervention,
equilibrium in the market for
historic preservation is at point A,
the intersection of the supply curve
and the occupants’ demand curve.

This free-market outcome does not
account for the demand for historic
preservation by non-occupants,
however, who can enjoy historic
structures without paying to do so.
The efficient level of historic
preservation would account for the
total demand from occupants and
non occupants, and is determined at
point B, the intersection of total
demand and the supply curve.
Historic-preservation tax credits
shift the supply curve for historic
preservation to the right, thereby
increasing the level of historic
preservation produced. Taking
account its cost, an optimal historic
tax credit policy would result in an
equilibrium at point C. Note also
that the post-tax credit price—
which would be paid by
occupants—is lower than the freemarket price, and that the cost paid
by taxpayers for each unit of historic
preservation is the difference
between the efficient price and the
post-tax credit price.5

Figure 4. Historic Preservation as a Public Good

Rent
Premium

Supply

($/sq. foot)

Efficient
price

Free-market
price

Supply
with tax
credit

B

A
Demand
(occupants plus
others)

Post-tax credit
price

C
Demand (occupants only)
Market
level
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Efficient
level

Historic
Preservation

In reality, the determination of the
optimal historic-preservation tax
credit policy is not as easy as
drawing a graph, primarily because
of the difficulty in determining the
value that non-occupants place on
historic preservation. This is
compounded by the dual nature of
historic-preservation tax credits,
which are also used as tools for
spurring employment or income
growth. As stressed by Courant
(1994) and Rothstein and Wineinger
(2007), estimates of the
effectiveness of such policies should
take account their broad effects on
welfare, not just on their effects on
employment or growth.

4.C. Agglomeration Economies
When a business is considering
opening a new establishment or
moving some of its activities into an
area, its decision depends on its own
profits only. It might be the case,
however, that entering an area
would increase the profits of
business that might already be
located nearby, or that are also
considering a move into the area.
Similarly, the potential entrant might
see higher profits if other firms were
already located nearby. That is,
firms’ decisions can have positive
externalities and there can be benefits
to firms agglomerating or clustering
in certain areas.
The benefits of clustering can arise
for several reasons, such as firms
being near to their suppliers or to a
specialized workforce, and can be
obtained without any government
intervention at all. This situation can
illustrated by Figure 5, which
considers the long run profitability
of a single firm as dependent on the
existence of firms producing related
products. Imagine, for example, that
a firm wants to open a factory to
produce tables and is considering a
location near a large forest that can
5
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Figure 5. Agglomeration Economies and Firm Profitability

Price
Average Cost
(1 firm)

Breakeven Price
(1 firm)

4.D. Involuntary Unemployment

Market
Price
Breakeven Price
(2 firms)

Average Cost
(2 firms)
Marginal Cost
(1 firm)
Marginal Cost
(2 firms)
Firm’s Output

provide wood to its factory. If the
firm would be the area’s only
consumer of wood, its breakeven
price is at the intersection of the
solid average and marginal cost
curves in Figure 5. In the figure, this
breakeven price is above the market
price, which is given to the firm.

the figure, this breakeven price is
below the market price, the table
producer would be profitable in the
long run and would decide to open
a factory in the area. An analogous
story can be told for the chair
producer, which would benefit from
the existence of the table producer.

In the background of this firm’s
decision is another firm that
produces the wood used to make
the tables. Wood production might
have strong economies of scale,
meaning that the cost (and,
therefore, the price) of wood falls
the more wood is produced. If there
were a second consumer of large
amounts of wood, say a firm
producing chairs, local wood
producers would be able to capture
economies of scale and the price of
wood would fall, thereby lowering
costs for the table producer. In
other words, the table producer’s
breakeven price would be lower, as
in the figure where it is at the
intersection of the dashed average
and marginal cost curves. If, as in

According to the story above, the
producers of wood, chairs, and
tables all might benefit if their
production is clustered in the same
area. Market forces alone might
create such a cluster, as evidenced
by the existence of large numbers of
industry clusters. It is a bit of a
mystery why clustering occurs
where it does, and it is often
attributed simply to luck. A great
deal of development policy,
especially the provision of tax
credits, is driven by governments
seeking to make their own luck by
providing the right incentives to
kick start an agglomerative process.
Specifically, according to this
argument, such a process might be
set into motion if a state were to

WALL

provide tax credits to one or more
of the three firms in the story. Of
course, the trick for policymakers is
being able to foresee the firms and
industries that should be induced,
and the landscape is littered with
expensive failures.

According to both Bartik (1990 and
1994) and Courant (1994), state and
local development incentives should
be used to address structural
unemployment, but not cyclical
unemployment, which arises from
fluctuations in the overall
macroeconomy. Structural
unemployment, they argue, can arise
in the longer run because of local
conditions even when the economy
is fully into expansion.6
To Courant, structural
unemployment can persist because
of the high cost of moving to where
the jobs are (spatial mismatch). Bartik,
on the other hand, has in mind
involuntary unemployment that
arises because wages are not
determined where the number of
workers wanting to work equals the
number of people working (the
market-clearing wage), as in the
benchmark model. Instead, he sees
the efficiency wage model as more
relevant to labor markets. In this
model, because it is difficult to
monitor worker effort there is an
incentive for workers to shirk.
Employers would then pay an
efficiency wage above the marketclearing wage to increase the cost of
job loss and, therefore, ameliorate
the shirking. As a result, the wage is
above the market-clearing wage and
there is involuntary unemployment.
Economists are far from unanimous
in believing that the efficiency wage
model is the most-useful depiction
of labor markets, although the view
has many prominent adherents.
6
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Leaving that debate aside, if we
accept the model, how should
development incentives be targeted
so as to reduce involuntary
unemployment? If, as in the model,
firms cannot monitor shirking done
by its own employees, what chance
do state and local governments have
in targeting their development
incentives to counter involuntary
unemployment? To Bartik, the
answer is simple: development
incentives should be targeted toward
areas with higher measured
unemployment. It is quite a leap,
however, to conclude that the
higher measured unemployment
means greater involuntary
unemployment resulting from
efficiency wages. The theory does
not provide compelling explanations
for the differences in
unemployment that persist between
areas. There are other plausible
explanations for this phenomenon
(minimum wages coupled with
significant differences in human
capital, for example), for which
targeted development incentives are
not a solution.
5. THE EFFECTS OF
DEVELOPMENT
INCENTIVES IN GENERAL
The small but growing literature
estimating the effects of tax credits
is part of a larger literature
examining the many different forms
of targeted development incentives.
Because most of the lessons learned
from the broader literature are
readily applicable to tax credits, it is
worth summarizing it.7 There are
three prominent surveys of the
effectiveness of development
incentives in general as tools of
economic development [Buss, 2001;
Peters and Fisher, 2004; and Bartik,
2005]. All three concluded that there
is little evidence that development
incentives had been effective, but
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each has its own perspective on why
this was so.
Buss (2001), who surveyed the
studies done prior to 2000, argued
that the evidence is weak because
development incentives actually
were ineffective. Even so, he faults
the literature as providing “little
guidance to policy makers trying to
fine-tune economic development (p.
101).” Further, “(d)epending on
how one reads the literature,
policymakers and their advisers
should (or should not) intervene in
economies (p. 101).” Buss
concluded with a list of suggestions
for policy makers in dealing with
this lack of guidance.
Most of Buss’s suggestions are ways
to deal with the uncertainty
surrounding the existence of
beneficial results from the
incentives. In other words, if
development incentives can be
beneficial, then his suggestions
would increase the chances that they
are applied where the benefits are
greatest. If incentives are harmful,
on the other hand, then following
his suggestions would at least
minimize their damage. For
example, he provides the altogether
sensible suggestion that
policymakers should perform costbenefit analyses prior to providing
development incentives. The fact
that Buss found it necessary to
suggest cost-benefit studies in
advance of a policy being
implemented speaks volumes about
the process by which these policy
decisions were—and largely still
are—made.
Peters and Fisher (2004) surveyed
basically the same literature as Buss
and provided an assessment that
was even more negative. They
outlined what they saw as the three
broad failures of development
incentives: (1) There is little-to-no

evidence that they lead to significant
new investment or jobs; (2) When
targeted at distressed areas, much of
the benefit goes to people who live
elsewhere; and (3) Supposed
government fiscal benefits are
illusory because, even if revenue
increases directly from the
subsidized area or firms, this will be
offset by losses from other areas
and firms. Rather than providing
suggestions for improving the
outcomes of development
incentives, Peters and Fisher bluntly
advised public officials to lower
“their expectations about their
ability to micro manage economic
growth” and to focus instead on
“providing sound foundations for
growth through sound fiscal
practices, quality infrastructure, and
good education systems—and then
letting the economy take care of
itself (pp. 35-36).”
Bartik (2005) also found only
modest empirical support for the
use of development incentives,
although he attributed this to the
misapplication of incentives rather
than to their actually having modest
effects. He is much more certain
than Buss about how and under
what circumstances incentives could
be beneficial, and, unlike Peters and
Fisher (2004), he argues that
policymakers could improve their
use of development incentives if
they did a better job targeting them
at distressed areas. The basis of
Bartik’s analysis is his earlier call to
focus development incentives on
instances of market failure (Bartik,
1990 and 1994). Although his earlier
call provided a list of market failures
that could be addressed, this later
work focuses on only one—
involuntary unemployment arising
from efficiency wages. As noted in
the previous section, however, such
an approach is not without
significant caveats.

7
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The Literature Estimating the Effects of State Tax Credits on Employment
Author(s)
State
Findings
Bartik and Erickcek (2010)
Faulk (2002)

Georgia

Benefits per job from MEGA credits were five times the
costs per job.
Recipient firms in Georgia saw increased employment, 3/4
of which would have occurred without tax credits.

Gabe and Kraybill (2002)

Ohio

Incentives did not lead to higher employment in recipient
firms, but recipients' overstated projected job growth.

Greenbaum et al. (2010)

Ohio

Tax incentives were not allocated more toward distressed
areas.

Hoyt et al. (2008)

Kentucky

Border counties saw small increases in employment,
probably due to an increase in out-of-state commuters.

LaFaive and Hicks (2005)

Michigan

MEGA credits did not increase county-level employment
in Michigan

LaFaive and Hohman (2009)

Michigan

MEGA credits were associated with county-level job
losses in Michigan.

Luger and Bae (2005)

North
Carolina

Incentives led to increased employment in recipient firms,
but at a very high cost per job.

Sohn and Knaap (2005)

Maryland

Some targeted sectors experienced agglomeration effects
that increased employment sector-wide.

6. THE EFFECTS OF
DEVELOPMENT TAX
CREDITS
The discussion in section 4 provides
the efficiency arguments for
development incentives, but the
dominant focus of policy
discussions and the literature
estimating the effects of incentives
is on what happens to employment.
While this might be expected from
policy discussions among noneconomists, it is disappointing that
the empirical economics literature
has not done more to bring the
focus on efficiency. Even so, an
initial focus on employment is
understandable given its importance
and its measurability, but it ignores a
number of important efficiency
considerations. In the case of public
goods and historic tax credits, for
example, efficiency gains can occur
without any measured increase in
employment. Further, as discussed
in detail by Rothstein and Wineinger
(2007), many other tax credit
WALL

Michigan

programs in Missouri are targeted
with equity considerations going
hand in hand with development
goals. Proper program evaluation
would account for all of these
considerations. Nonetheless, the
question at hand is the existing
literature on the measurable effects
of state tax credits, warts and all,
and employment is as good a
measure as any to start with.
There are two types of papers in the
literature (see the table), one which
has estimated the effects of tax
credits on the employment of
recipient firms and the other that
does so for the larger economy
(usually the state or county). As
noted when relevant, some of the
studies bundled tax credits with
other types of incentive. For these
cases, however, tax credits were the
dominant form of incentive. Before
surveying this literature, it is worth
looking at a recent paper looking at
the where tax credits have tended to
go.

As already noted, Bartik, among
others, has suggested that for
development incentives to be
effective they should be targeted at
distressed areas. A recent paper by
Greenbaum, Russell, and Petras
(2010) took this view as given and
asked whether incentives have been
directed toward distressed areas.
They looked at data on three
incentive programs in Ohio,
including a statewide Job Creation
Tax Credit (JCTC) program, which
is available for businesses investing
in the state, especially in distressed
areas. The authors found that,
despite the program’s stated
objective, the number of JCTC
incentives per thousand employees
was not related to any of several
measures of economic distress.8
They also found no evidence that
the dollar value per thousand
employees for the three programs
combined was related to economic
distress.

8
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There are at least two opposing
interpretations of these results. One
could argue that the results
demonstrate Bartik’s point that the
lack of evidence of the effectiveness
of development incentives is
because they have not been targeted
appropriately. On the other hand,
one could argue that, given that the
stated objective of the program was
to target distressed areas, the fact
that this was not actually done
demonstrates a systemic
government failure. Despite the
legislated objectives of the program,
the incentives were directed
elsewhere because of rent-seeking
activities and political
considerations.

6.A. Recipient-Firm
Employment
One would think that development
tax credits, particularly those linked
directly to job creation, ought to at
least increase the employment of the
firms that receive them. As a
testament to the weakness of the
evidence in favor of these policies,
however, the literature is ambiguous
on this basic issue. In the debates
preceding the allocation of
incentives, the most oft-cited
numbers are for the total number of
new jobs that recipients claim that
they will create after receiving the
credits. This is not the relevant
number, however, because it may
well be that the recipient firm would
have done nothing differently in the
absence of the incentive. We would
be more likely to expect an increase
in employment if the amount of the
incentive was tied to the actual
increase in the number of jobs
(rather than the planned number).
Without a link between the level of
incentive and jobs actually created,
tax credits would likely increase the
number of jobs only if the venture
would not have been pursued at all
without the incentives.
WALL

Gabe and Kraybill (2002)
considered data on 366
establishments in Ohio that
expanded their employment
between 1993 and 1995. Of these
establishments, 129 received some
form of incentive from the state,
and 101 of them received corporate
tax credits under the Ohio JCTC
Program. The dollar amount of the
tax credit was not linked directly to
the number of new jobs, but to the
income taxes withheld for new
workers.
The authors focused on two
questions: Did firms that received
incentives expand their employment
more than they would have if they
had not received the incentives? Did
businesses that received incentives
overstate the number of jobs they
would create, perhaps so that they
would receive larger incentive
packages? Gabe and Kraybill
concluded that the answers to these
questions are, respectively, probably
not and apparently so. Specifically,
after controlling for a long list of
factors that would affect
employment levels, firms receiving
incentives were found to have
expanded by slightly less than they
would have if they had not received
the incentives (457 jobs versus 467
jobs, on average). On the other
hand, the announced future
expansions of firms that received
incentives was 27 jobs higher, on
average, than if they not received
incentives.
Faulk (2002) estimated the effect
that Georgia’s JCTC had on
employment in recipient firms.
Unlike the Ohio program, Georgia’s
was linked directly to increases in
the number of employees.9
Georgia’s program was also an
entitlement, meaning that any firm
that met a series of eligibility
requirements could take the tax

credit. To find the effect on
recipients, Faulk exploited the fact
that the majority of eligible firms did
not claim any tax credits. After
controlling for the variables that
determined whether a firm chooses
to participate, she compared the
employment changes of the two sets
of firms to determine the role
played by the tax credit.
Faulk found that Georgia’s job tax
credit program did lead to higher
employment in recipient firms.
Specifically, recipient firms created
about 25 percent more jobs than
non-recipient firms. On the other
hand, she also found that roughly
three quarters of this difference
would have occurred even if the
program had not been in place. Put
another way, of the $5 million that
Georgia spent on the tax credits in
the program, about $3.75 million
was spent on jobs that would have
been created anyway. If the entire
increase in employment is used in
the calculation, the cost per job of
the program would be $630. If the
jobs that would have been created
anyway are subtracted out, the cost
per job rises to around $2,500.
Luger and Bae (2005) examined the
potential employment effects of a
list of tax credit programs in North
Carolina, taking a different approach
from the earlier literature. Their
simulation approach is much less
data intensive than the econometric
approaches that are more typical. As
a result, it is potentially useful in
projecting the effects of tax credit
programs in advance, rather than
waiting for several years after the
fact to estimate the results.10 They
projected that, while North
Carolina’s various programs
increased net employment in firms
receiving tax credits, they did so at
very high costs. Specifically, they
calculated a per job cost $147,000 if
the number of jobs that would have
9
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been created without the programs
were subtracted out. This is in
contrast with a cost of about $5,000
per job if this correction were not
done.
Sohn and Knaap (2005) examined
whether a jobs creation tax credit
program in Maryland increased
employment in eligible located in
distressed areas given special
preference in the program. They
found that the impact of the
program was mild and sectorspecific in that they found that only
two of the five targeted sectors saw
increased employment because of
the tax credits. They also found,
however, that the number of jobs
attributed to the credits was
nevertheless greater than the
number of jobs for which credits
were received. Their results are
consistent with the influence of
agglomeration effects under which
job subsidies given to some firms
led to increased employment in
non-recipient firms within the same
sector.

6.B. Total Employment
Studies like those summarized
above, which looked at the effects
of tax credits on recipient firms, are
interesting because they can unlock
some basic understanding about the
programs. Specifically, they tell us
that tax credits have not been found
to lead to relatively large increases in
employment even in the firms
receiving them. While this is an
important insight, the studies do not
tell us very much about the welfare
or efficiency effects of the tax credit
programs. In the studies discussed
in the preceding subsection, only the
direct costs in terms of the value of
the tax credits are considered when
calculating the costs of the policy
per job. The costs do not include
any of the costs imposed on the rest
of the local economy by the
WALL

diversion of labor and other
resources to the subsidized firms.
Any employment increases that are
attributable directly to the programs
can be offset by employment
reductions elsewhere in the
economy as labor and other
resources become more expensive
for firms not being subsidized.
For example, if the number of
workers in an area is relatively fixed
in the short run, then the additional
number of workers that a recipient
firm hires because of tax credits
must come from elsewhere in the
local economy. If they were all
unemployed involuntarily, then the
program has a net positive effect
roughly equal to the number of jobs
created by the recipient firms. But, if
all of them were already employed
elsewhere in the area, which is more
likely the more skilled the workers
are, then the net effect on
employment is zero, or worse. The
workers would be drawn from other
firms, which might not survive
because of the effect of the subsidy
given to other firms competing with
them over the same scarce resource.
In the longer run, workers can move
into the area to take the jobs created
directly by the tax credits. The
extent to which this occurs will
determine the long run effects on
the original residents of the targeted
area.
Hoyt, Jepsen, and Troske (2008)
looked at county-level data for
Kentucky and examined whether
higher levels of tax credits resulted
in higher county employment
growth. Their data were for the
totals of all types of tax credits
received by firms in each of 120
counties for every year from 1994 to
2005. After controlling for
differences in demographics, school
expenditures, and taxation, they
found a small but statistically
significant positive effect for tax

credits on employment. Specifically,
a ten percent increase in tax credits
would have increased county
employment in the short run by
about 0.013 to 0.015 percent. They
also found, however, that most of
this effect was due to expansions
that occurred in counties bordering
other states. In other words, tax
credits had small effects for border
counties as some establishments
located in Kentucky instead of just
over the border, but had almost no
effect for interior counties.
Hoyt, Jepsen, and Troske also
estimated the effects of worker
training incentives and found that
the impact per dollar was much
higher than for tax credits. They
suggested that this is because job
training incentives result in the
transfer of some general skills that
are useful to all firms in a county,
whereas tax credits are specific to
the firms that receive them. Also,
the employment data they used was
for firms, meaning that the data do
not indicate where the workers
lived. When they used data on the
local labor force instead of local
employment, they found that the
effect of tax credits was statistically
insignificant for both border and
interior counties. This suggests that
a large percentage of the jobs
created by the tax credits and
worker training incentives went to
people who lived in neighboring
states and commuted into Kentucky
to work. This result is consistent
with the typical finding that the
majority of jobs created by
development incentives go to
workers living outside of areas
receiving the subsidy.
The tax credit programs of
Michigan have received the most
attention in the literature so far. The
programs, administered by the
Michigan Economic Growth
Authority (MEGA), have been the
10
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subject of three independent studies
using very different methods and
achieving sometimes very different
results.
LaFaive and Hicks (2005)
performed the first assessment of
MEGA, using a time-series panel of
Michigan counties.11 They used data
on all counties in Michigan for
1990-2003 and used their model to
account for “long-run trends in the
economy, the business cycle, labor
force participation rates, and the
impact of adjoining counties (p.
87).” In estimating their model they
tried to control for selection bias
due to the fact that MEGA credits
are targeted to some extent at
distressed counties. Without
controlling adequately for selection
bias it might be possible to misread
any negative correlation between
growth and tax credits as an effect
of the credits rather than as a result
of the mechanism for distributing
them.
LaFaive and Hicks found that the
effects of MEGA credits on countylevel per capita income,
employment, and unemployment
rate were most often statistically no
different from zero. In fact, they
sometimes found the program to
have had negative and statistically
significant effects. For no county or
variable did their results indicate a
positive and statistically significant
effect for MEGA credits. They cited
four reasons why MEGA credits
apparently did not work as its
proponents had anticipated. First,
the model that MEGA used to
project the effects of the credits was
seriously flawed; second, it is
difficult to know whether tax credits
are necessary for an employment
expansion too occur; third, there
were political incentives to use
MEGA credits to claim credit for
job growth; and fourth, the
economy is too complex for
WALL

attempts at fine tuning to be
successful. They concluded,
unsurprisingly, that MEGA credits
did not result in improved economic
outcomes for Michigan as a whole.
LaFaive and Hohman (2009)
reported an analysis of Michigan
counties that focused on changes in
manufacturing employment from
2001 through 2007. They used shiftshare analysis to divide changes in
each county’s manufacturing
employment into three parts:
general trends in the Michigan
economy, the performance of
manufacturing in Michigan, and the
performance of manufacturing in
the county. They then compared the
county-specific component of this
analysis to the MEGA credits
received by firms in the counties,
finding a statistically significant
negative relationship. Specifically, a $1
million dollar increase in tax credits
was associated with the loss of 95
jobs in a county. The authors did
not claim that they had proven a
negative causal link between MEGA
tax credits and manufacturing
employment, but they did claim that
such a link is possible and provide
several reasons why.
Bartik and Erickcek (2010) took
issue with the results of LaFaive and
Hicks (2005) and LaFaive and
Holman (2009), claiming that their
statistical approaches did not
adequately address potential
selection bias.12 Bartik and
Erickcek’s own approach was to
first calculate the direct job effects
for firms that received MEGA
credits and to then insert these
numbers into a forecasting model
that they used to represent the
dynamic structure of Michigan’s
economy. The result of this effort is
the claim by Bartik and Erickcek
that MEGA credits produced a
benefit per year of over $20,000 per
job created while incurring an

average cost per year of less than
$4,000. They attribute this success
to “the program’s emphasis on
export-based, high-wage industries
with strong local supplier links (p.
20).”
In evaluating the evidence on the
effects of MEGA credits, we are left
with a choice between two very
different sets of results. On the one
hand, the econometric approaches
of LaFaive and his coauthors take
data on actual changes in county
employment and try to determine
the parts that can be attributed to
MEGA credits rather than to other
factors. Bartik and Erickcek are
right to be wary of these results
because of the inherent difficulty in
controlling for selection bias and the
many factors that can affect
employment growth. They are,
however, far too cavalier in their
dismissal of these results, especially
in contrast with their unquestioning
acceptance of their own approach,
which is based on the REMI
forecasting model.13
Although it is popular and used
widely to analyze local economies,
the REMI model relies on
numerous assumptions—especially
having to do with multiplier effects
and government fiscal constraints—
that would not find universal
acceptance among economic
forecasters.14 In effect, Bartik and
Erickceck’s results depend on a
model that assumes the market
failure model of involuntary
unemployment. In other words,
instead of estimating whether or not
tax credits led to increased
employment, Bartik and Erickceck
simply assume that there was a
positive effect and then use the
REMI model to find out how large
the effect was. Although any
econometric approach, including
those used by LaFaive and others,
have the potential to suffer from
11
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statistical problems, they are do not
rely on simply assuming positive
effects of tax credits.



7. SUMMARY AND
CONCLUSIONS
As summarized above, three
prominent surveys of the wider
literature concluded that there was,
at best, modest evidence that
development incentives have been
effective in generating local
economic activity. This evidence led
one surveyor—Buss— to advise
policymakers to be very cautious
because of the uncertain effects of
development incentives. The
authors of the second survey—
Peters and Fisher—were led by the
same evidence to advise
policymakers to abandon their
efforts at micromanaging their local
economies and focus instead on
providing infrastructure and
education. On the other hand, the
author of the third survey—
Bartik—held out hope that
incentives could be effective if they
were targeted at distressed areas,
where they could do the most good.
The literature on state development
tax credits, which amounts to the
nine papers listed in the table at the
start of the previous section is by no
means large, although it has much in
common with the wider literature
on the effects of development
incentives in general. As
summarized by the table, the papers
are not directly comparable to each
other because they use different
empirical approaches to study the
effect of tax programs in different
states and with different incentive
structures. Nevertheless, along with
the earlier literature on incentives in
general, they are all we have to go
on for now. The three general
lessons to be derived from the
literature are
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Tax credits have not generally
been found to lead to increased
employment even at firms that
receive them. This result seems
to depend somewhat on the
incentive structure of the tax
credit program.
In some sectors and some
localities, it is possible for tax
credits to lead to increased
employment in non-recipient
firms. This suggests that
agglomeration economies might
play a limited role in
determining the effectiveness of
tax credits. The literature
provides little to no guidance,
however, as to when and where
tax credits can be targeted for
this purpose.
State tax credits do not tend to
lead to higher levels of
employment for local residents,
nor, by extension, do they lead
to higher levels of employment
for state residents.15

NOTES
See Eberts (2005), who summarized the
types of development incentives that are
used, and Zheng and Warner (2010), who
described how the mix of incentives has
changed over time.
1

Chirinko and Wilson (2010) and Wilson
and Notzon (2009) provide summaries of
their prevalence across states, and
Thompson (2010) focuses on New England
states.
2

Information on the Missouri Tax Credit
Review Commission, including its final
report, can be found at its website.
3

Comprehensive descriptions of Missouri’s
programs are available from the Committee
on Legislative Research and in the briefing
material for the Tax Credit Review
Commission.
4

Because nonoccupants cannot be charged
directly for their consumption, there can be
no equilibrium where the supply with the
tax credit intersects the demand from
occupants and nonoccupants.
5

Note also that policies should avoid trying
to reduce frictional unemployment, which is a
reflection of natural turnover and job
search.
6

For research on other policies, see
Bondonio and Greenbaum (2007) and
Hansen and Kalambokidis (2010), who
look at enterprise zones; Dalehite, Mikesell,
and Zorn (2005) and Reese, Larnell, and
Sands (2010), who look at property tax
abatement; and Mason and Thomas (2010),
who look at tax increment financing.
7

These lessons are consistent with
the general literature on the, at best,
lukewarm effects of development
incentives on local employment.
Keep in mind that the tax credit
programs that have been examined
are typically geared directly at job
creation. This suggests that for
states like Missouri, which tend to
have dual-purpose tax credit
programs, it would be difficult to
find strong evidence that
development tax credits have
generate significant increases in
overall economic activity.
Howard Wall is professor of economics;
director of the Hammond Institute for Free
Enterprise; and senior research fellow in
the Center for Economics and the
Environment at Lindenwood University.

These are the unemployment rate, the
poverty rate, percent minority, percent
without a high school degree, and median
housing value.
8

Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (2001) provide a
description of the various tax credit
programs in place in Georgia at the time.
9

Calcagno and Thompson (2004) have a
highly stylized model to simulate the
welfare effects of broad tax incentives. The
advantage of their approach is that it is
capable of calculating the effects of the
incentives on the overall allocation of
resources in an economy. These models
become very technically advanced
verquickly, and have not yet become a
regular tool in the literature.
10

These results are also found in LaFaive
and Hicks (forthcoming).
11

12
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They also criticized a study by
commissioned by the Michigan Education
Association and the National Education
Association that is not reviewed here
because it is arguably neither independent
nor academic in its approach (Anderson,
Bolema, and Rosaen; 2010).
12

The model is a product of Regional
Economic Modeling, Inc.
13

MEGA’s own use of the REMI model
has been criticized by LaFaive and Hicks
(2005). See Mills (1993) for one description
of the REMI model.
14

This result is incompatible with Bartik’s
notion of large pools of involuntarily
unemployed workers ready to be drawn
into employment with proper incentives for
employers. However, given the evidence
that tax credits are not always targeted at
distressed areas, this evidence is not entirely
conclusive on this point.
15
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